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Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico:  
Culture of Corruption or Corruption of Culture? 
 




Excessive and costly bureaucratic procedures and shrinking economic and social 
policies have restricted options for Mexican society to function effectively. In order to 
achieve outcomes demanded by organisations or to fulfil their duties as citizens, 
Mexicans must operate in the informal polity, outside or against frameworks of 
regulations. In the context of growing transnational activities the increasing role of 
unregulated activities is perceived as a large problem, producing loss of control and 
even criminality that must be eradicated. Mexican people are caught between a battle 
for economic survival and the burden of a dysfunctional government bureaucracy, the 
legacy of modernisation and economic rationalism. In that context the use of informal 
practices is perceived as an easier, or often the only way, to make things happen. 
 
Citizens have to fulfil their rights and responsibilities in the interface between 
government and the public, in a system characterised by undemocratic practices and 
abuses of power at all levels. These circumstances have led to an increase of 
unregulated activities, and boosted the informal sector and the informal polity 
associated with it. In order to function and fulfil their obligations in such a constrained 
environment, Mexican citizens and organisations must find alternative strategies.  
 
                                                 
1 An earlier and preliminary version of this paper was presented in the AILASA conference in Sydney, 
Australia, 27-29 September 2006. 
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The informal polity contains a range of informal practices used to deal with limitations 
of the formal system and its excessive regulations, what I call ‘doing it a la mexicana.’ 
Informal practices include favores (favours), palancas (levers, a little help from insiders 
or powerful supporters), deploying social reciprocity and family networks, using 
coyotes (persons paid to do administrative procedures on others’ behalf, mostly through 
personal contacts inside the organisation), giving regalos (gifts) and paying mordidas 
(bribes). In a developing nation in a Neoliberal world these informal practices become 
survival strategies, alternative ways for people to deal with administrative procedures 
that are rigid, inefficient and expensive.  
 
The informal polity is often labelled corruption, but this is problematic. Practices vary 
and can be considered legitimate or illegitimate from different perspectives. Some can 
be interpreted as sources of unfair competition, as discriminatory practices or plain 
corruption, while others demonstrate creativity, innovation or merely a struggle to 
survive. Individuals dealing with civic duties or working on behalf of organizations 
interacting with officials claim the processes are dysfunctional, forcing them to use any 
strategy to get by. Some such strategies can be considered corruption, but others not. 
 
Judgements of these practices are influenced by ideological and political discourses 
from other cultures, organised around a distinction between developed and developing 
countries. Such a division and the ideologies that legitimise it dominate the political and 
economic international contexts in which businesses operate. Countries are evaluated 
through global instruments defined by views and values from powerful economic 
players, developed countries and their corporations. Developing countries, such as 
Mexico, are under their scrutiny, and must regulate their internal affairs following 
guidelines defined by lender or aid institutions (like the World Bank or International 
Monetary Fund) that serve the interests of countries and corporations who benefit from 
the economic performance of aid recipients.  
 
A condition for support is that countries should undertake Neoliberal reforms: lower 
tariffs, privatise public companies, reduce taxes to attract investment, spend public 
funds for modernisation not social welfare (Woodward 2005). For countries to be 
competitive in the global market they need to be (or at least look) attractive (Porter 
2001), with low risk, and low levels of corruption.  
Coronado       Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico 
 
PORTAL, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2008.  3 
These pressures create contradictory demands for developing countries such as Mexico. 
Corruption in contemporary Mexico exists and can be found at all levels of social, 
political and economic life. Corrupt governments have accumulated huge fortunes from 
public resources, and individuals engage in more or less serious acts of corruption in 
their everyday life (Morris 1991). But governments have to control the growing 
informal or underground economy and its associated informal practices, in conditions of 
underdevelopment and reductions in the already inadequate welfare support, where 
there is no alternative to offer (Theobald 1990). For people to cope under these 
conditions means to find their own ways, through common informal practices. 
 
Informal practices in earlier times were socially acceptable (e.g. local officials in 
colonial times personally charged for services to complement their low salary (Lomnitz 
2000) but these are now perceived as corruption, and government and society are urged 
to eradicate them. It is important to recognise, also, that eradicating corruption in 
developing nations does not necessary serve the interests of all players. As has been 
noted in the literature on corruption and development (e.g. Robinson 1998) some 
practices identified as corruption may be advantageous for global business operations, 
providing economic activities otherwise not available or serving as the ‘grease’ that 
dysfunctional bureaucratic organisations need to deliver. Even if such views are 
contentious they highlight ambiguities and contradictions underlying anti-corruption 
initiatives.  
 
My purpose here is modest. I focus on issues associated with informal practices that can 
be seen as survival strategies but are judged as the culture of corruption. I will draw 
attention to implications of discursive practices that represent and define corruption, 
pointing to the ideological constructions that help to mask the problem, blaming 
practices as causes instead of recognising them as effects of larger historically rooted 
political and economic interests. I also explore some implications of metaphoric 
language used in the Mexican public discourse about corruption that connect corruption 
to cultural values.  
 
In this framework I consider the implicit postcolonial ideology through which countries 
and their cultures are understood in global exchanges, influencing the way corruption 
and country attractiveness are measured. To highlight the impact of postcolonial 
Coronado       Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico 
 
PORTAL, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2008.  4 
ideologies I briefly refer to two instruments used by global business to measure country 
risk: Transparency International (TI) Index (www.transparency.org) and Hofstede’s 
dimensions of national cultures (2001). Then I analyse some examples of anti-
corruption initiatives in Mexico. In my interpretation I draw on my own experience as a 
Mexican, and on a research project in Mexico from 2005-2007 on the use of informal 
practices.2 Although in this paper I do not analyse stories collected in the research 
project, they are implicit in my interpretations of the perspective of ordinary Mexicans.  
 
‘Culture of Corruption’ and Postcolonial Ideology 
I lived in Mexico most of my life, experiencing the difficulties created by dysfunctional 
bureaucratic systems. I dealt with public offices, always fearing I would be unable to 
fulfil my needs or duties as a citizen. Every time I asked myself: Do I have enough 
money to pay the expensive imposts, and more if they ask me for a mordida? Are they 
going to ask me for another document not mentioned before, making me waste another 
day? Are they going to send me to another desk after one hour in a queue? Or ask me to 
come back tomorrow? Many other Mexicans like me have to deal with these concerns 
every time we pay for services, get driving permits or just drive in the city, or complete 
the procedures to marry, to register a birth or death. Mexicans confront these difficulties 
everyday throughout their life. They also embody what is commonly called the problem 
of corruption, captured in the phrase cultura de la corrupción (culture of corruption).  
 
The association of corruption with culture in this phrase implies that Mexican culture 
(like that of any comparable nation) is characterized by corruption that seems to derive 
from tradition through our socialization, inherited from our ancestors. It implies we 
have been ‘imprinted’ by corruption in the way we behave. It highlights also a core 
problem for global business. Culture and corruption seem to come together as a problem 
for global agents, unsure of how to treat potential business partners, and reduce the risk 
they will spoil ‘good’ business. Even though there is often a reluctance on the part of 
theorists to link corruption with culture, some writers from a business perspective make 
this link overt, as for example, Davis and Ruhe (2003) who correlate the TI corruption 
index and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions in country assessments. 
                                                 
2 This project is part of a comparative project on informal practices, Cross-cultural ‘larrikins’ in a Neo-
liberal world: ideology and myth in postmodern Australia, Mexico and Brazil, with the participation of 
Prof Bob Hodge, Dr. Gabriela Coronado, Dr. Fernanda Duarte and Dr. Greg Teal. 
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The phrase ‘culture of corruption,’ according to Morris (2000: 227, note 16), was first 
used in the corruption literature by Le Vine in 1975. In Mexico it now has wide 
currency, in ordinary conversations, in newspapers (e.g. La Jornada 10/02/2002) and 
official documents (e.g. Escobar 2004), to refer to a complex problem that Mexico must 
solve before she can participate fully in the global economy. The connotations of 
corruption as culture, along with other metaphors, such as the ‘cancer of corruption,’3 
exert a powerful influence on the way corruption is understood, and anti-corruption 
efforts are designed (for the impact of metaphoric language see Morgan 1998).  
 
A common definition of corruption applied by monitoring organisations to measure ‘the 
extent of corruption’ is ‘the misuse of public power for private benefit’ (Lambsdorff 
2004: 3). Such a broad definition is, however, too reductive and misses important 
distinctions needed to understand the problem and do something about it. When 
measuring and trying to reduce the ‘extent of corruption’ it is misleading to ignore 
distinctions between practices treated as equal under such a general understanding of 
corruption.4 Is it the same to fight against ‘petty corruption’ as ‘grand corruption’? Is 
the same strategy needed to combat bribes in the conduct of public services as to obtain 
multimillion-dollar contracts? Is it the same to ask for a favour to get a job when you 
are unemployed as to ignore drug trafficking or white collar fraud? Obviously not.  
 
Rule-breaking happens in every society but there are many ways of judging the actions 
and their impacts. Different forms of breaching the social order are given different legal 
or moral weight depending on the outcomes, the power and status of rule-breakers and 
beneficiaries, and the cultural values of the country or organization in which they 
happen. Depending on cultural, social, economic, ideological and political factors, 
similar practices in different situations (e.g. public or private, formal or informal), or in 
different countries, (e.g. developed vs. developing), might be labelled acceptable or 
unacceptable, as demonstrating creativity and flexibility or as corruption. To judge such 
practices sometimes as corruption and sometimes not involves intercultural ideological 
forms, historically constructed in the complex global dynamics of international relations 
as postcolonial ideologies (see During 2000). Said (1978) has shown that representing 
                                                 
3 This metaphor is used among others by James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank in 1996 (in 
Seligson 2002: 410, note 6) 
4 For broader perspectives on corruption in different contexts and countries see: Heidenheimer, Johnston 
and LeVine 1989; Rose-Akerena 1999; Morris 1991; Valverde n.d. 
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the world in these terms is a strategy, ‘Orientalism,’ by which colonial powers 
(mis)represent the ‘other’ from the perspective of the dominant westerner as a means of 
domination. Based on economic and political dominance some nations consider their 
cultures as inherently superior, and those who are different as inferior.  
 
Postcolonial ideologies have influenced global representations of countries and cultures 
in the context of global markets, and are implicit in discourses of managerialism (see 
Chiapelo & Fairclaugh 2002), which have become hegemonic among business 
organisations and beyond, shaping the way governments construct political discourses 
(Hodge & Coronado 2006). The managerial discourse impacts on the way countries 
interact with each other in the context of globalization, culturally, politically and for 
trade (Spich 1995). As such it can be considered a discursive regime (Foucault 1971), in 
which privileged speakers reinforce through their language the interests of the dominant.  
 
Framed by this hegemonic discourse, international bodies, mostly led by developed 
nations, represent and measure corruption globally, considering it a risk, another 
cultural obstacle, for developing countries wishing to integrate into the global economy, 
inhibiting Multinationals from doing business with them. Corruption is perceived as a 
‘country risk,’ affecting their level of ‘attractiveness.’ According to the findings of the 
World Business Environment Survey, country scores in corruption indexes are 
important considerations for investment decisions (Bartra et al. 2003), a key factor in 
the international business environment to differentiate nations in terms of competitive 
advantage (Porter 2001). To be competitive in gaining access to foreign investment, a 
country needs to look attractive in the eyes of potential investors, as attractive as any 
other ‘commodity’ offered in the marketplace (Kotler et al. 1993). Consequently, 
countries need to eradicate corruption or at least show they are trying. 
 
In this context, the assumption that corruption is part of the culture conveys the sense 
that countries rated with high risk have a behaviour deeply rooted in their collective 
consciousness, that everyone shares the values associated with such cultural behaviour, 
and acts on them in their everyday practices. In this view it is not an anomaly produced 
by individuals acting against the social order but the effect of the common values of the 
whole society, passed on across many generations, naturalised as acceptable to all 
members and highly resistant to change. From the perspective of the people whose 
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‘culture’ is under judgement, this reinforces the sense of collective undervaluation in 
postcolonialism. It is also useful for some who benefit from denouncing or not rejecting 
practices that are actually not aspects of the national culture but rather institutionalised 
conditions under which they seek profits in the Neoliberal political economy. The 
metaphor ‘culture of corruption’ displaces the problem and obscures ways of dealing 
with it, thus ignoring other areas that in fact lead to corruption in its worst forms, 
benefiting corrupt, self-serving governments and elites, and not the people.  
 
Representing corruption as part of the culture works well to benefit transnational sectors 
wanting to do business in ‘developing’ countries. If corruption is seen as part of the 
‘host’ culture, and ‘experts’ on intercultural business relations advise them to be 
culturally sensitive and respect the culture of the ‘other’ and act accordingly, even 
though they claim to know are wrong (see Westwood 2006), then business should 
follow those practices. In this way postcolonial assumptions about culture serve to 
justify many acts of corruption carried out in the name of cultural sensitivity. The 
management of intercultural issues in the expansion into other markets has been 
influenced by the ideas of Hofstede (2001 [1980]), whose understanding of national 
cultures was based on a survey applied in one organisation, IBM. His study focused on 
what can be considered in a broad sense ‘organisational culture,’ the way of doing 
things in an organisation (for an overview of different understandings of organisational 
culture see Alvesson 1993).  
 
The data he collected indicated how employees in different countries report behaviours, 
attitudes and preferences in the workplace in different nations. That data was interpreted, 
classified and ranked, producing characterisations that were generalised as if 
representative of the whole national culture. An analysis of his interpretations of 
cultures reveals an implicit dichotomy, in which the Anglo/protestant/western behaviour, 
‘our way,’ is naturalised as the ‘right’ behaviour, while alternative practices from other 
nations, the ‘other’s way,’ are implicitly assumed to be wrong: inefficient and immoral 
(see Fougere and Moulettes forthcoming). 
 
Generic attitudes, which Hofstede calls ‘dimensions of culture’—‘high/low power-
distance,’ ‘individualism-collectivism,’ ‘high/low uncertainty avoidance’ ‘masculinity-
femininity’—were applied to classify cultures in asymmetrical binaries. One kind of 
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behaviour is associated with negative outcomes for business and its opposite with 
positive ones. From an Anglo business perspective the characteristics of the ‘other,’ 
usually the developing countries, become by definition negative behaviours, 
deterministically reproduced by their culture and judged indiscriminately as a problem 
for business operations. Such ideological interpretation of behaviours related with the 
cultural dimensions are defined as natural to the ‘culture’ of these nations and the source 
of their problems (for example, in a collectivist society the use of friends and family 
networks), or highly regarded for those ranking high in power distance structures. 
Following this influential perspective the culture of the ‘other’ is assumed to be an 
obstacle that corporations need to ‘tolerate’ and deal with to be effective (for business 
discourses of tolerance as a postcolonial strategy, see Coronado, forthcoming). 
 
To consider corruption as inherent to culture assumes a link between corruption levels 
in a country and its cultural characteristics. It is important to take culture into account 
but to do so in such a simplistic way is problematic. Corruption as a complex 
phenomenon includes some links with cultural practices, in which agents of corruption 
take advantage of the ‘contradictions and ambiguities of the normative system for 
personal lucre’ (Lomnitz 2000, 15 my translation; see also Harrison and Huntington 
2001). But that normative system and its cultural practices are not fixed nor limited to a 
specific nation, but linked to the broader conditions in which economies and political 
bodies operate inside each nation and interact in the global context (Bull & Nevel 2003; 
Elliot 1997). In this light I will evaluate the link between practices associated with 
corruption and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. 
 
The Ideological Measurement of Corruption. 
The association between cultural dimensions and corruption was not an aim in 
Hofstede’s work, although the link is made in the business literature, and he explicitly 
introduced it in recent revisions of his work (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). It is easy to 
correlate cultural dimensions in his terms with practices that are perceived and 
measured as corruption in the indexes: ‘collectivist’ cultures can be associated with 
nepotism and ‘individualist’ with individual merit; high ‘power distance’ with abuse of 
authoritarian power and discretionary power, while low power-distance is claimed to 
generate fairness. Masculine cultures are associated with machismo, which produces 
favouritism, discrimination and sexual harassment, whereas feminine cultures promote 
Coronado       Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico 
 
PORTAL, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2008.  9 
equal opportunity and care for the needy. The link between corruption and uncertainty 
avoidance, i.e. ‘the extent in which members of a culture feel threatened by unknown or 
ambiguous situations’ (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005: 167) is more ambiguous, since it can 
be seen as a positive quality in the context of business competitiveness, with flexibility 
or capacity for innovation; but it also relates to rule orientation, daring to break rules or 
not, which in itself creates unknown situations. Paradoxically, for Hofstede strong 
uncertainty avoidance (as in Mexico, 82 in the index) is associated with more perceived 
corruption (2005: 168 & 352).  
 
Corruption and innovation both involve ‘breaking rules,’ but in one case it is assumed to 
have damaging effects while in the other it is seen as positive for the competitive global 
market, now recognised as uncertain. To judge the act of breaking rules positively or 
negatively is problematic, and similar practices are judged differently, depending on the 
contexts, perceptions of the development-status of the countries, how the behaviours are 
associated with those national cultures, and views of cultures reflecting postcolonial 
ideologies. Corruption and inefficiency are commonly seen as inherent characteristics of 
the culture of ‘developing’ nations. As such, the place they occupy in the corruption 
index is unequivocal. They have ‘wrong’ behaviours according to the cultural 
dimensions, and therefore are economically underdeveloped and rank high in corruption. 
All these qualities come neatly together, and naturalize the link in the eyes of 
international business managers who rely on these ratings as an easy way to make 
decisions. 
 
Corruption indexes assigned by bodies such as Transparency International (TI), and 
cultural values connected with ‘good management,’ become important tools to evaluate 
a nation’s attractiveness (high or low risk). Under this ideology a country judged as 
corrupt wanting to reform must try to change that perception, reduce its scores and put 
anti corruption schemes in place, learning from more developed nations how to manage 
properly.  
 
In order to show similarities between measurement of corruption and countries’ cultures 
I will compare them. Both instruments legitimise their authority with a scientific 
discursive regime, which promises that their ‘truth’ has been rigorously obtained. The 
statistical apparatus allows extrapolation of findings from subjective judgements, 
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perceptions, and attitudes, elicited from samples as if they referred to the whole nation. 
The behaviour of some persons from this sample, which is not even statistically 
representative in their own terms, becomes ‘THE culture/behaviour’ of a nation. 
Perceptions of organisational culture or ‘extent of corruption’ provided by participants 
in the sample are ascribed to the society as a whole. Both instruments take the scientific 
discursive regime seriously, and include explicit statements about the limitations of the 
instruments, but these are buried in the more technical texts, and then ignored in the use 
of the measurements by the wider public, non-government organisations, governments, 
academics and businesses.  
 
Both instruments use the same ideological strategy, which draws on the views and 
values of business people as if they were the sole legitimate possessors of knowledge 
about that society. In Hofstede’s study, the ‘experts’ on national culture are IBM 
managers (although it is not clear in all cases whether the managers were nationals or 
expatriates). In TI, the Index ‘reflects the views of business people and analysts around 
the world, including experts who are residents in the countries evaluated’ (Transparency 
International 2004, 6). As experts they know the ‘other’ since they live there and do 
business with them. For a brief illustration Table 1 compares the two instruments, to 
show elements in common in their postcolonial strategies.  
 
Country classifications based on measurements of cultural dimensions and corruption 
indexes become guidelines for businesses operating globally, trying to reduce risks. 
Intentionally or not, the measurements misrepresent whole societies. Their cultures, 
including their propensity for corruption, are perceived as inadequate, difficult or 
impossible to change. Imprecise and wildly generalised judgements on countries as 
more or less corrupt without distinguishing what kind of practices are measured allow 
whole societies and cultures to be ‘blamed,’ for practices of specific sectors or 
individuals that are not always targeted by anti-corruption campaigns.  
 
Fighting Corruption the Mexican way 
To make Mexico ‘attractive’ the government is meant to control the levels of corruption 
that have been measured and publicised through Corruption Index, but Neoliberal 
pressures confront Mexican governments with a paradox: they need to regulate the 
informal polity and the corruption associated with its practices, and simultaneously 
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ignore the fact that it is happening. To penalise the practices of the informal economy 
without offering an alternative to increasing unemployment and poverty will not stop 
the problem and might create another country risk, political unrest.  
 
Elements.  Hofstede’s National Culture 
Dimensions. 
Transparency International 
Lambsdorff’s Background Paper to 
the 2004 Corruption Perception 
Index. 
Definitions of concepts 
in essential terms that 
encompass multiple 
practices. 
Broad Definition of culture: Based 
on few dimensions of organisational 
culture, as representing the whole 
culture of a society.  
‘The software of the mind.’ 
 
 
Broad definition of corruption:  
‘Corruption can range from petty 
bureaucratic corruption (such as the 
paying of bribes to low level officials) 
right through to grand political 
corruption (such as the paying of large 
kick-backs in return for the awarding of 
contracts).’ 
Individual perceptions 
treated as objective 
truths. 
Attitudes in the workplace toward 
bosses and colleagues are the 
nation’s behaviour. 
Perceptions of ‘propensity’ to act 
corruptly as actual corruption. 
Culture as homogenous 
at national level.  
Sample behaviour is considered 
homogenous for whole country and 
region.  
Construction of Country perception 
index from the results of a few surveys 
not systematically applied.  
Imprecise terms in the 
instruments of 
measurement. 
Individual ‘preference’ in the form 
of operating inside an organization. 
Extent of corruption measured by 
imprecise terms: ‘prevalence,’ 
‘commonness’ ‘frequency,’ 






Cultural dimensions of the other 
negatively valued, the developed 
positively E.g. Collectivism = 
corruption vs. Individualism = 
democracy. 
Business sectors as moral authority to 
judge nation’s behaviour: perception 
from ‘senior business people,’ ‘panel of 
experts,’ ‘elite business people,’ ‘staff 
to a foreign country,’ ‘expatriate 
business men.’  
Table 1: Measurement of culture and corruption in comparison 
 
To deal with this paradox, governmental agencies act inconsistently, sometimes banning 
some practices, at other times ignoring them. They have also introduced minor changes 
that reduce the perceived potential of the informal polity to become actual corruption, 
by regulating a posteriori what is already out of control. One such move was to create 
designated spaces for illegal street sellers. Another attempt to regulate the unregulated 
was to reduce the bureaucratic structure involved in delivering services by government 
agencies, a program called Simplificación administrative (Administrative 
Simplification). This program attempted to reduce corruption in the interface between 
the public and the service desk by making some public services free or redirecting 
payments to the budget office cashier (Tesorería) or into banks. In that way the 
circulation of money associated with fees (and exposed to bribes) was transferred to 
public or commercial institutions that have no involvement in the administrative process.  
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The impacts of this kind of initiative are difficult to evaluate, but according to peoples’ 
perceptions (from interviews) to submit and pay for an application does not avoid being 
asked for a ‘tip,’ which is generally given with the unspoken fear that otherwise the 
process will be delayed, or the documents ‘lost’: 
 
in the entrance there is a giant sign that says: No payment for procedures in this office. 
Everything to be paid in the tesorería. But when we married, when we have already signed, he 
told us “Well … mmh ... whatever you would like to give for the judge’s cooperation …”5 
 
Although just anecdotal, this example points to the need to distinguish between culture 
of corruption for survival and institutionalised corruption, another phrase used to refer 
to the problem of corruption in countries with high corruption indexes. Institutionalised 
corruption is an outcome of complex historical, political and economic conditions that 
shaped how governments and economic elites have functioned in the country, from 
early colonial times till the globalised present (See Semo 2000). It refers to the 
conditions under which citizens and organisations interact with public bureaucracies, 
within a legal framework that in Mexico is seen as undemocratic, inefficient, 
discretional and insecure (del Castillo & Guerrero 2003). The distinction is useful given 
the impacts that simplistic views of the phenomena have on the success or failure of 
anti-corruption initiatives. The two phrases point to different understandings of the 
phenomena and how to fight against it. 
 
To illustrate the postcolonial ideology in the discourses that have emerged out of global 
pressures (from finance institutions, corporations and global organisations) to control 
corruption levels in Mexico I will analyse two examples I found during my research in 
Mexico City, in April-May 2006. The examples come from different initiatives that self 
represent as against the ‘culture of corruption,’ promoting the ‘culture of legality.’ One 
is a May 2006 press release from Transparencia Mexicana (TM), the Mexican chapter 
of Transparency International. The second is a billboard from the Consejo de la 
Comunicación AC (Council of Communication, Civil Association), a business 
organisation that calls itself La voz de las empresas (the voice of business). 
 
 
                                                 
5 All translations of Spanish are mine: ‘en la entrada dice un letrero gigante: en esta oficina, ningún 
trámite tiene costo. Todo lo tienes que pagar en la- tesorería pero cuando nos casamos, ya que firmamos 
no sé qué, nos dijo “Bueno ... pues .... este ... lo que gusten cooperar para la juez”‘ (Interviewee 
06/05/2006)  
Coronado       Discourses of Anti-corruption in Mexico 
 
PORTAL, vol. 5, no. 1, January 2008.  13 
Transparency Mexican’s public voice 
Transparency Mexican is the ‘author’ of the document I analyse. Its self-description 
appears at the bottom of the page by way of a signature:  
 
Non-government organisation which combats corruption in Mexico from an integrated 
perspective, through public policies and private attitudes which go beyond policy 
pronouncements to generate concrete changes in the institutional framework and the culture of 
legality.6  
 
In order to communicate to the public through the media this organisation released a 
synthesis of the last results of the application of the Índice Nacional de Corrupción y 
Buen Gobierno (National Index of Corruption and Good Governance in Mexico). Table 
2 includes some elements from the document that highlight the ideological construction 
of corruption in this text. 
 
 My translation Quotes in Spanish 
Title: Mexico, stuck in its corruption levels: 
Transparency Mexican. 
‘México, estancado en sus niveles de 
corrupción: Transparencia Mexicana.’ 
Name of 
Instrument: 
National Index of Corruption and 
Good Government.  
‘Índice Nacional de Corrupción y Buen 
Gobierno.’ 
Scope: In 3 levels of government and private 
business.  




Payment of bribe or ‘mordida,’ which 
was declared by Mexican households. 





Households …headed by youngsters, 





‘hogares…encabezados por jóvenes, así como 
aquellos que tienen mayores niveles educativos.’ 
Results: Households inclined to pay bribes.  
From country households, the ones 
headed by young people, as well as 
those who have the highest education 
levels, continue to be more inclined to 
participate in acts of corruption.  
‘Propensión de lo hogares a pagar sobornos’ 
‘De los hogares del país, los encabezados por 
jóvenes, así como aquellos que tienen mayores 
niveles educativos siguen siendo los más 
propensos a participar en actos de corrupción.’ 
Table 2: Elements of the press release from Transparency Mexican. 
 
One press release from Transparencia Mexicana is too little to prove much. However, 
when analysed closely it throws up relevant meanings for my argument. First, the title 
produces a shock in the audience (myself, in the first instance). Through its links with 
Transparency International the speaker, TM, establishes its expert status to evaluate 
corruption in Mexico. From that position it declares that Mexico is ‘stuck in’ levels of 
corruption, which suggests that everything done so far has failed. The reader learns later 
                                                 
6 For original in Spanish see full document in Appendix at the end. 
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in the text that in fact this is not so, that there have been improvements in some sectors 
and that actually ‘Half the number of the country’s federal entities reduced the 
occurrence of corruption’ in some services. The text mentions fluctuations in different 
years, a reduction from 2001 to 2003, increasing in 2005 but still lower than in 2001. 
Even though the information provided in the document paints a more complex picture, 
the simplistic title conveys a sense of failure that implies the difficulties of changing a 
culture of corruption into a culture of legality, the aim of this organisation as presented 
at the end of the press release. In this reading, the text creates a sense that small 
outcomes are insufficient to fulfil the grand aim of this organisation: to transform 
Mexico’s culture of corruption into a ‘culture of legality.’ 
 
From other sources we find that the comparison is inexact, since the data does not come 
from a longitudinal study but from different samples. It is unclear if the differences 
cited showed that the various groups are more honest in reporting bribes, or if the actual 
corruption in the delivery of services has changed. Detailed information about the 
instrument is available in the organisation web page (http://www.tm.org.mx) but to the 
public, the press release and article arouse the maximum concern. 
 
The grammatical subjects of the different sentences in the text produce confusion. It is 
difficult to know who the agent of corruption is, and who is trying to improve. Mexico 
is a problematic subject of the sentence in the title. If it is subject, Mexico is the agent of 
corruption, illustrating the postcolonial strategy in which an evaluation based on a 
sample of individual perceptions is generalised to construct an image of the whole 
nation as responsible for the success or failure of the action. If Mexico is the agent, then 
what is the role of the entidades federativas (states of the federation) that the same 
document says are reducing the incidence of corruption? In those cases they are not 
agents of corruption, but agents who reduce corruption. How is it possible that the 
whole is the agent of corruption, and the parts are those who try to reduce it?  
 
There is another ambiguity in the name of the instrument. What exactly is the index 
measuring? Corruption? Or good government? Does it imply that those are opposites, so 
that reducing corruption means good government? In Spanish the use of the word 
gobierno creates the sense that the problem is mostly associated with government 
offices, so that private businesses (even if mentioned as providers of some of the 
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services evaluated) are made invisible. The document does not mention which services 
are public and which are private. This imprecision shifts the focus onto the practices of 
common people, those who reported bribes, not those who demand them and are the real 
targets of the Index: those in charge of trámites (administrative procedures) or who 
provide servicios públicos (public services). The document is also imprecise about its 
scope, implying that the Index registers the payments of all bribes declared, as if its 
scope were universal when actually the index is based on a sample and not all those 
surveyed may have reported honestly.  
 
There is another agent of corruption included in the text. According to the document the 
Index registers the payment of bribes, mordidas, declared by hogares. The word can be 
translated as household but its literal translation is ‘homes.’ Hogares has emotional 
connotations that connect with family life, the intimate space in which individuals are 
socialised. This tacitly reinforces the idea that corruption comes from the culture: by 
stating that ‘homes’ ‘declared’ they paid bribes, it implies that ‘homes’ are the agents in 
these acts of corruption, ergo, it is a cultural practice. If ‘Mexican homes’ are ‘inclined 
to’ pay bribes, as stated in the text, does it mean that members of a family home are all 
inclined to be corrupted, thus condemning the culture to continue without change?  
 
The presentation of the outcomes continues this ambiguity. One phrase emphasises the 
home’s inclination to be involved in acts of corruption: ‘The results raise an alert about 
homes’ inclination to pay bribes.’ From this and other similar phrases used in the 
document we are led to suppose that all members of the family are corrupt, thus 
increasing the number of people supposedly included in the sample, justifying the 
generalisation to the whole of Mexico. In another document from the same organisation 
the mathematical basis is explained: a sample of ‘14,019 homes with between 383 and 
514 households surveyed in each federal region’ is then ‘extrapolated to the whole 
population’ where ‘the results imply almost 101 million acts of corruption in the 38 
services during the year’ (Transparencia Mexicana 2005). In a country of 103.3 million 
(according to the 2005 Census, INEGI 2005) if this is treated as an average this 
‘extrapolation’ makes it seem that each citizen (except for 2.2% honest Mexicans) 
committed a corrupt act that year. 
 
In another part of the press release TM focused on one kind of ‘home’ especially 
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‘inclined’ to be corrupt: young and educated. Interestingly, in this case the term used is 
soborno instead of mordida. Both terms in this context would be translated by the same 
English word, bribery, but the text distinguishes between the two, ‘soborno o mordida.’ 
The difference is the gravity of the ‘crime.’ The term mordida is part of the Mexican 
‘folklore of corruption’ (Covarrubias 2003) linked in the text with ‘petty corruption,’ 
which ‘affects the income of Mexican homes’: mostly those with less than the minimum 
income (in 24% of cases, the text informs us). By comparison the young and educated 
‘homes,’ not in the lowest income sector, are constructed as involved in more serious 
corruption, paying sobornos.  
 
The text does not offer readers an explanation of this behaviour, letting them form their 
own conclusions. One reason for the figures is that these youngsters may be more ready 
to report bribes. In one of my interviews with a family of 3 women of different 
generations the youngest criticised her mother for denying that she has used informal 
practices (favores) to help her to solve problems. Other possibilities are that this sector 
is frustrated to be unemployed or poorly paid after long years of study and investment in 
education, or that they refuse to waste their time in tedious bureaucracy when they are 
paid more than the cost of bribes paid to low-wage employees. The young people’s 
‘inclination’ to pay bribes, whether it reflects frustration, cynicism or lower moral 
values, challenges the postcolonialist assumption that corruption is higher in less 
developed countries because of their cultural backwardness. If we suppose that the 
young and educated are more influenced by other cultures, in Mexico this means 
adopting ‘the American way,’ omnipresent in Mexican media and life (Coronado & 
Hodge 2004), how does their propensity come from supposedly corrupt and backward 
Mexican culture?  
 
It is also plausible, although difficult to demonstrate without more extensive research, 
that their attitudes can be linked to changes of social expectations and values influenced 
by their exposure to Neoliberal and postcolonial ideologies, which have failed to deliver. 
Under a global economy the promise that individual success and higher consumer 
capacity will bring economic development, higher employment and social prosperity is 
only fulfilled for the few who, according to the dominant discourse, are developed, have 
the right cultural qualities and therefore inhabit a culture of legality. For the rest, 
Neoliberalism and Postcolonialism not only fail to transform the economic, social and 
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political conditions in which corruption is played out, but through this failure help 
reproduce the institutionalised corruption that produces winners and losers in both 
developed and developing worlds.  
 
 
Image 1: Billboard in the streets of Polanco, Mexico City (© Author) 
 
The Voice of Mexican Business  
When I was driving in Mexico City in May 2006 in a wealthy neighbourhood, Polanco, 
a street billboard caught my attention. At first I did not realised that it was an anti-
corruption campaign by business organisations. I passed it many times, and only when I 
was able to read all parts of the text and image did I appreciate its relevance for my 
research. Then I stopped to take a picture (See image 1).  
 
My initial puzzlement came from the fact that the image and the related text that 
dominates it, Pa’l chesco, refers to a popular phrase that means ‘for a fizzy drink.’ This 
meaning is reinforced by the image of a bottle with a straw. Even though in some cases 
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asking for a soft drink might be a euphemism for demanding a bribe,7 the language used 
in the poster is mostly associated with low income workers providing a service. The 
expression usually comes as a polite request: Señito, ahi pa’l chesco,¿ no? (Dear 
Madam, something for a fizzy drink, no?). Literally it is a request for something to buy 
a cool drink after hard work under the sun. I have heard it all my life, when someone 
has provided me with a service; from people who serve petrol in a garage station who 
do not receive a salary, from macheteros (men that carry building products) delivering 
bags of cement or bricks to your house, known to earn low wages, and also from 
employees of big companies who deliver products, and are probably earning the 
minimum salary. I did not see a similar campaign in other less affluent neighbourhoods. 
Why was it run there? Was it directed to wealthy people, recommending them not to 
give tips? Or was it trying to compensate for the bad image of business from 
international scandals such as Enron? 
 
At first glance we might suppose that the people running this campaign are familiar with 
the language and culture of ordinary people who use this phrase, and sympathetic to 
their needs. But by linking the phrase in the top with the next line ‘we are thirsty for 
honesty’ (and other phrases below) the text constructs an opposition. It implies that one 
action, workers asking for a soft drink, is the problem that needs to be solved, to fulfil 
the wish of business for honesty. At the foot of the image the speaker is identified as the 
Council of Communication A.C. (Civil Association), who declare that they are the voice 
of business. Above this ‘signature’ is an image of a falling drop of water, creating 
ripples. This image implies that this small contribution from business, the billboard, will 
expand and produce the change needed to satisfy their desire. The question is how this 
phrase used by common workers plays a part in the campaign, as against the business 
leaders’ ‘thirst for honesty’? The two phrases polarise two sectors. Business are thirsty 
for honesty and do not use that language (implying they are not corrupt) while common 
people are literally thirsty and cannot buy a soft drink but are to blame for corruption, 
like the ‘homes’ the TM press release identified as having inclinations to be corrupt. 
 
Below the image the statement ‘NO A LA CORRUPCIÓN’ (Say no to corruption) 
indicates that the main voice in the text is that of people united in honesty to reject 
                                                 
7 As in an example reported by del Castillo and Guerrero: ‘si quieres con el refresco nos arreglamos’ (if 
you want with a soft drink we can fix it) (2003: 21). 
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corruption. But if corruption in this view is interpreted as demanding a tip, what actions 
would oppose it? To impose a new rule that low-paid employees are not allowed to ask 
for a tip? Or maybe, if we believe in the good will of businesses (at least those united 
against corruption) they will increase wages so that workers do not need to ask pa’l 
chesco? A sceptic will suspect that they will just continue with their campaign as 
‘ethically responsible businesses,’ saving some taxes for this contribution to society, 
building a positive image, and maybe, still profiting from institutionalised corruption. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
Through analysing these two examples I draw attention to the weight given in anti-
corruption initiatives to practices from the informal polity, mostly associated with 
poorer sectors of society. These practices are not so much a culture of corruption as 
basic to survival. From this we can see that to represent corruption as inherent in a 
culture targets informal practices used by common people to survive, instead of 
focusing on the contexts of institutionalised corruption, which involve national and 
global agents pressuring developing countries to become cheap open markets, with the 
reduced welfare required by Neoliberal models as conditions for aid or loans.  
 
The so-called culture of corruption has attributed the ‘problem’ to culturally learned 
behaviours of common people, who supposedly act in that way in any context, whether 
as citizens or on behalf of private or public organisations. Corruption in this view is 
linked to the country’s ‘cultural dimensions,’ which according to the postcolonial 
managerial discourse prevent the country from perform efficiently in the global 
economy. According to this ideology, stopping corruption means changing the 
behaviour of common people, ‘the family homes that are inclined to corruption.’  
 
The analysis of anti-corruption initiatives shows their focus on behaviour at lower levels 
of bureaucracy and in the ‘homes’ that interact with them, not exposing systemic 
practices that owe much to global pressures in the contemporary Neoliberal 
dispensation. Ordinary Mexicans have internalised discourses that characterise their 
practices as a ‘culture of corruption.’ But these practices, irrespective of whether they 
are called culture, folklore, cancer, creativity, flexibility or corruption, seem their only 
way to deal with a state bureaucracy economically and politically complicit with the 
interests of the Neoliberal global economy.  
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The examples analysed from Transparencia Mexicana and La Voz de las empresas show 
that these bodies, intentionally or unintentionally, respond to those interests and 
perspectives, promoting an image in which common people acting a la mexicana are to 
blame for the poor image that makes Mexico unattractive and uncompetitive. In that 
context, discourses of transparencia (transparency), moralización (moralisation) 
honestidad (honesty) or buen gobierno (good governance), adopted by governments, 
politicians and business groups to fight this soft target, appear as just rhetoric, and 
probably do not really aim to change Mexico for the benefit of its peoples. 
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